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Introduction 
In this paper we focus on modelling as a creative process to gain new knowledge 
(meaning) about material and immaterial objects by generating and manipulating 
external representations of them. Modelling is widely understood and used as a 
heuristic strategy in the sciences (Frigg and Hartmann 2012, Mahr 2009) as well as in 
digital humanities (hereafter DH) research where it is considered a core practice 
(McCarty 2005: 20–72). In the last two decades there has been a significant 
development of theory that complements the practice based tradition of the field (e.g. 
ibid, Buzzetti 2002; Beynon et. al. 2006, Jannidis and Flanders 2012; Flanders and 
Jannidis 2015).  
We aim at enriching the current theoretical understanding by contextualising DH 
practices within a semiotic conceptualisation of modelling. A semiotic approach 
enables us to contextualise DH modelling in a scholarly framework well suited to 
humanistic enquiries, forcing us to investigate how models function as signs within 
specific contexts of production and use. Kralemann and Lattmann’s (2013) semiotic 
model of modelling complemented by Elleström's (2013) theories on iconicity are 
some of the tools we use to inform this semiotic perspective on modelling.  
We then go on to contextualise Kralemann and Lattmann’s theory within 
modelling practices in DH by using three examples of DH models representing 
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components and structure of historical artefacts. We show how their model of models 
can be used to understand and contextualise the models we study and how their 
classification of model types clarifies important aspects of DH modelling practice.  
What is Modelling? 
In this paper we take a pragmatic definition of modelling as a starting point. Indeed, 
interdisciplinary theories around modelling are used mainly to inform our analysis of 
modelling practices. By modelling we intend a creative process of thinking and 
reasoning where meaning is made and negotiated through the creation and 
manipulation of external representations. We narrow this definition further by 
applying it to modelling as a research strategy: modelling is a process by which 
researchers make and manipulate external representations – what Godfrey-Smith 
(2009) calls ‘imaginary concreta’ – to make sense of the conceptual objects and 
phenomena they study. 
Modelling in DH is often understood as “any act of formal structuring” of data 
intended as „formal information” (Flanders and Jannidis 2015: 4). Our point of 
departure (see also Ciula and Eide 2014; Ciula and Marras 2016) is however wider 
exactly to allow us to explore whether a more encompassing definition can overcome 
some limitations of a narrower take on modelling. Rather than prioritising a 
conceptualisation of modelling directed first and foremost at communicating with the 
computer, we rather attempt at seeing modelling as a means to create “tools for 
thinking” (Bradley 2015).1 
                                                 
1 Our pragmatic understanding of modelling is comparable to what Beynon et al. call Empirical 
Modelling: “Model-building in EM [Empirical Modelling] evolves through an extended process of 
observation and experiment in which exploration and negotiation of meaning play a fundamental role” 
(2006: 152). In our work we make specific reference to Peirce's semiotic pragmatism rather than 
Jamesian pragmatism, since the latter implies a different understanding of experience and hence of the 
Final published version: 
http://dsh.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/fqw045?ijkey=QFoN0r8n1SS8gac&keytype=ref  
Semiotics and DH Modelling 
Rather than framing our reflection on modelling around human-machine 
communication or on implementative purposes in a strict sense, we propose to 
consider modelling as a process of signification and reasoning in action. 
Contextualising modelling within a semiotic framework means indeed to consider it 
as a strategy to make sense (signification) via practical thinking (creating and 
manipulating models). We use an interdisciplinary perspective on modelling to guide 
us both in understanding how models as signs are made (the construction of models) 
as well as in understanding how something new is discovered in the process of 
making and using models (the epistemic and heuristic value of models). 
Dynamic Relation Models/Objects/Interpretations 
Kralemann and Lattmann (2013) claim that models should be understood as signs in 
the Peircean sense. In Peirce’s seminal theory of signs, the sign is a triadic relation 
between a representamen (the sign from which the relation begins, sometimes also 
called in the literature the sign-vehicle), its object, and the interpreting thought. Often 
represented as a tripod where the three ‘composing elements’ (Olteanu 2015: 127)  – 
object, representamen and interpretant – intersect, the sign for Peirce is hence, first 
and foremost, relational. The experience of interpreting signs or signification 
(semiosis) is therefore intrinsically dynamic. As a consequence, a semiotic approach 
which considers models as signs gives high prominence to a dynamic view on models 
                                                                                                                                            
use of the term 'pragmatism'. See Olteanu 2015 (81-104) for an informed and detailed explanation of 
this. What is particularly insightful in Peirce's philosophy for us is his “understanding of life in term of 
phenomena of signification” (idem: 83), which goes beyond and even against the epistemological 
account of (relativist) experience in James. 
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reinstating in renewed terms the value of modelling as an open process2 – in particular 
a process of signification.3 
 
Fig. 1: The model relation includes the following components: a set of objects Oi=1,...,n 
(what Kralemann and Lattmann call the ‘extension’ of the model), a theory or 
language (what they call the ‘intention’ of the model) and an object Omod (its 
attributes define what Kralemann and Lattmann call the ‘syntax’ of the model). For 
the subject who chooses Oi and a theory or language, Omod becomes a model of the 
objects Oi on the basis of a representational relation between its syntax and the 
semantic attributes of Oi. This relation is determined by the context of a theory as well 
as by the purpose of the specific act of modelling. 
                                                 
2 This echoes of course McCarty’s approach to modelling as “orientation to questioning rather 
than to answers, and opening up rather than glossing over the inevitable discrepancies between 
representation and reality on which that questioning focuses” (McCarty 2005: 38). 
3 This work of contextualising modelling within a semiotic approach builds on Kralemann and 
Lattmann (2013) as well as its recent applications to modelling in DH (Ciula and Marras 2016; Ciula 
and Eide 2014). 
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Models as Icons 
The semiotic theory of signs proposed by Peirce identifies three types of signs based 
on the relation between the object and the sign: symbols (e.g., conventional names 
used to denote objects), icons (e.g., onomatopoeic words such as ‘splash’), and 
indexes (signs used to point directly to their meaning, such as ‘there’). In this respect, 
Kralemann and Lattmann (2013: 3399–3400) claim that models are icons, because the 
dominant relation with the objects they represent is one of similarity, as shown in Fig. 
2. In Peircean theory, such iconic relation of similarity is what makes icons signify; 
icons act as signs based on how the relation of similarity is enacted: via simple 
qualities of their own in case of images, via analogous relations between parts and 
whole and among parts in the case of diagrams, and via parallelism of qualities with 
something else in the case of metaphors (Olteanu 2015: 77 and 193). 
Different shades of iconic similarity between sign and object as theorised by 
Pierce correspond to three kinds of models in Kralemann and Lattmann:4 
●  image-like models, for example real life sketches where single qualities such 
as forms and shapes enable them to act as signs of the original objects they 
represent in given circumstances; 
●  relational or structural models, for example diagrams such as the relation 
exhibited in the graph of a mathematical equation, where the ‘interdependence 
between the structure of the sign and the structure of the object’ (ibid., 3408) 
enables the modeller to make inferences about the original by manipulating its 
model; 
                                                 
4 The distinction between the three types of hypoicons is not meant to be clear-cut. We follow 
Elleström (2013) amongst others in seeing these types as grades of a continuum or even of a 
development rather than separate categories. 
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●  metaphor-like models which represent attributes of the original by a non-
standard kind of parallelism with something else which generates further 
models (metaphors are metamodels; ibid., 3409). 
In Kralemann and Lattmann’s theory as well as in Peirce’s original theory, models do 
not act as signs in virtue of themselves. What establishes the model as a sign is the 
interpretative act of a subject, whether as creator or reader. The practical act of 
modelling connects the model to its interpretation, that is, to its specific semantic 
content in a given social and institutional context (ibid., 3402–3). The modeller’s 
judgement depends on his or her presuppositions connected to “theory, language or 
cultural practice” (ibid., 3417). Models are contingent.5 Kralemann and Lattmann also 
reiterate the concept of models as middle ground between theory and objects.6 The 
relationship of iconicity between the model and the object being modelled is partly 
externally determined (it relies on the similarity between the model and the object) 
and partly internally determined (it depends on theory, languages, conventions, 
scholarly tradition, etc.). Based on this duality they stress, on the one hand, the 
subjectively determined dependency of models on prior knowledge and theory and, on 
the other, their independence from these in light of the specific conditions of the 
objects being modelled. 
                                                 
5 Beynon et, al. defend such pragmatic or empirical approach to modelling (based on William 
James’ pluralist philosophy of ‘radical empiricism’) which emphasises the role of informal semantics 
over the ‘formal semantics of computation’ (2006: 154). “[...] all kinds of conception of model are 
possible through assuming different kinds of context, observation, and agency”. (ibid. 155) On the 
historical contingency of models especially within the context of economics see Morgan (2012: 1–37). 
6 Extensive literature in philosophy of science especially focusing on the use of models in the 
empirical sciences recognises models (including computational models) as mediators between theory 
and objects of analysis (e.g. Winsberg 2003; Morrison 2009). Within a semiotic context, this finds a 
parallel in the concept of sign-vehicles functioning as mediators between denotational and 
connotational qualities, between thing and meaning (MacEachren 2004: 246). 
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Similarity, Iconicity, and Reasoning 
One consequence of seeing models as icons is that through an understanding of the 
process by which icons are made and used we can gain new insights on how models 
are built and used. This understanding highlights similarity as a key to link models to 
the modelled: 
Representation based on resemblance generally falls under the heading of ‘iconicity’. When 
something is understood to be a sign of something else because of shared, similar qualities, it 
is referred to as an iconic sign (Elleström 2013: 95). 
 
The notion of iconicity is however not only about how models (as signs) appear with 
respect to similarity to their objects. It also encompasses the possibility of 
manipulating models and reasoning with them.7 This is another point of connection 
between models and icons, a point that goes to the core of DH practice. 
                                                 
7 Following Nersessian, we subscribe to an expanded understanding of reasoning as ‘creative 
reasoning’ beyond logic and spanning the 'continuum' between ordinary and scientific problem-solving. 
Model-based reasoning is not a simple recipe always leading to correct solutions, and reasoning cannot 
be equated with logic. Most scientific practice does not fit the traditional philosophical ‘gold standard’ 
of deductive reasoning. “The ‘hypothetico-deductive’ method, which comprises hypothesis generation 
and the testing of deductive consequences of these, is a variation that focuses the fallibility of science 
with respect to the premises. This leaves out of the account the prior inferential work that generates the 
hypotheses. [...] In model-based reasoning, inferences are made by means of creating models and 
manipulating, adapting, and evaluating them. [...] Analogical, visual, and simulative modeling are used 
widely in ordinary and in scientific problem solving, ranging from mundane to highly creative usage. 
On a cognitive-historical account, these uses are not different in kind, but lie on a continuum.” (2008: 
11-12). We wish to thank Gabor Toth for pointing out the relevance of Nersessian's work to our 
research. 
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Fig. 2: The Peircean trichotomy of signs into icons, indexes and symbols based on the 
relation with its object (of similarity in the case of the icons) and the subsequent 
classification of icons (or rather pure icons or hypoicons)8 into images, diagrams and 
metaphors based on how the respective similarity relations signify. Highlighted in 
grey are the sign types associated with models by Kralemann and Lattmann (2013, 
fig. 2). 
 
Modelling in DH has a hybrid nature which combines implementation-oriented 
work with methodological inquiries bearing implications beyond the specific 
implementation. This distinction has recently been verbalised as one between 
altruistic and egoistic modellers in Jannidis and Flanders (2013, 138) and as one 
between modelling for production and modelling for understanding in Eide (2015a). 
An altruistic modeller will create a model for others’ use, often as part of a production 
project, whereas an egoistic modeller will create a model to be used at the individual 
                                                 
8 While it is outside the scope of this paper to account for the nuanced and precise terminology adopted 
by Peirce, it should be noted that he defines a subclass of icons called hypoicons which are in their turn 
divided into images, diagrams and metaphors; for a recent detailed and comprehensive overview of 
Peirce’s categories and taxonomy of signs see Olteanu (2015:  61–79). 
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level or by a group to inquire into a specific area of interest.9 In the latter case using 
models to reason with is considered to be a main goal of modelling, whereas in the 
former it rather forms part of a process with a mainly practical goal, for example the 
publication of a collection of documents.  
This distinction can be useful in analytical terms, but is problematic in that it 
ignores that all models are used as external representations to facilitate reasoning. 
Any model used in DH will to some extent be used for reasoning, and especially 
shared reasoning or negotiation of meaning. A model gives us a common language to 
talk about the world. To take one example: The Text Encoding Initiative (TEI)10 does 
not only give us a method for marking up texts, but also a language and formalism in 
which to think about textual phenomena such as manuscripts or poems. As stressed in 
Stachowiak (1973: 60), stringent and exact systems for making deductions are useful 
also when no generally agreed upon objective reality exists; they can even be more 
necessary when reality is elusive and negotiable.  
The use of models as external representations to reason with has important points 
of connection with Peirce’s thinking about icons and reasoning: 
Similarity, which is the root of iconicity, is not simply an absolute trait that is ready to be 
picked up in the external world; instead it is a perceived quality processed by subjective 
attention and selection, and a potent force in cognition. (Elleström 2013: 97) 
 
According to Peirce, “it is by icons only that we really reason” (Peirce 1933, CP 4.127 
[1893]). In more recent literature, cognitive sciences and the philosophy of scientific 
modelling have been brought together (Nersessien 2008). In particular, within 
theorisations of distributed cognition (Hoffman 2011: 199), thinking processes are 
                                                 
9 As pointed out by Beynon et al., “it is now possible to make computer models with which we 
can deliberately dwell upon our personal understanding of something of interest for its own sake, and 
without any functional use yet in mind” (2006: 146). 
10 http://www.tei-c.org/ (checked 2015-03-19) 
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seen as being distributed in the world and shared among different people through 
external mediations. Historical accounts of scientific practices establish model-based 
reasoning as a social problem-solving strategy comparable to practices in everyday 
life (Nersessian 2008). When we share our scholarly ideas using models in reasoning 
and discussion this is a type of process which is fundamentally icon-based in Peirce’s 
sense. The role of graphical representations in “external cognition” is described by 
Hoffman (2011: 192) as “diagrammatic reasoning to solve problems, to cope with 
complexity, to learn something new, or to resolve conflicts.” Seen as icons such 
diagrams fall into a wide variety of model types,11 from toy cars used as scale models 
to mathematical formulae and semantic networks. Why do we make such external 
representations? Wood (1993: 51) distinguishes between the process of mapping and 
the one of mapmaking, which consists of the difference between a gesture leaving no 
physical trace and making a permanent inscription.. The choice is based on the needs 
in concrete communication situations: if the communication need is complex, a map 
is better than just an allusive gesture. This distinction is not sharp and it is connected 
to the continuum between communication and reasoning, as pointed out by Hoffman: 
When I draw a map to explain a friend how to drive to a certain location, I would 
communicate by means of a diagram but I would not reason with it. Diagrammatic reasoning 
is about problem solving, decision making, knowledge development, and belief change by 
means of diagrams. However, I do not presuppose a clear cut distinction between 
diagrammatic communication and diagrammatic reasoning. There might be a continuity 
between both these possibilities. (Hoffman 2011: 193-194) 
 
Especially in project-based DH practice, where interdisciplinary groups work together 
to solve problems at practical as well as theoretical levels, reasoning and 
communication act as two sides of the same coin. 
                                                 
11 McCarty (2005: 32-33) qualified extensively the relationship between diagramming and 
modelling. 
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Grades of Iconicity 
As shown above, Peirce distinguished between three types of hypoicons: images, 
diagrams, and metaphors. Let us take the example of an apple. The image of an apple 
put up in the window of a grocery shop has a signification immediately perceived by a 
hungry tourist passing by. She will assume that the sign on paper, through its image-
like resemblance with a real apple, indicates that apples are sold in the shop. While 
this immediacy is not there to be seen for everyone and in every circumstance (it 
would not work for a person who does not know what an apple is or what it looks 
like, and it would not necessarily be experienced by somebody not interested in 
buying apples there and then), it is still general enough to be defined as an immediate 
image for apples within a given context. 
A botanical visualisation of the reproduction system of the apple plant can be 
used to exemplify a diagrammatic icon of apples. The diagram exhibits the structural 
similarity between the form of the organs as represented in the diagram and the organs 
we find in actual apples.  
Finally, a metaphorical icon can be exemplified by a representation of an apple as 
a sign of sin. This can be expressed in various forms, such as an apple in a biblical 
painting or expressions such as “she gave me the apple.” The whole expression – 
reduced to ‘sin is an apple’ – is the metaphor implying a relation between the apple 
and sin (the object of the model). This sign relation makes it possible for the object of 
the sign ‘apple’ to become an icon for the object of the sign ‘sin’ (cf. the example 
provided by Kralemann and Lattmann 2013: 3408–9), establishing a chain of signs. 
Hence the words of the poet Pablo Neruda “innocence is round like an unbitten apple” 
(Ode to the Apple). The relationship between the metaphorical icon and what it refers 
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to is one of complex cognitive leaps and is highly creative, as argued by Elleström 
and illustrated in Fig. 3: 
The representamen of an image is perceptually close to its object, which means that the object 
may be sensuously perceived in much the same way as the representamen (this is a conception 
that is close to Peirce’s own few remarks on the image). The representamen of a metaphor is 
at a greater distance from its object, which means that the interpretation of a metaphor 
includes one or several cognitive leaps that make the similarity between representamen and 
object apparent. (Elleström 2013: 104)12 
 
 
Fig. 3: The argument thus far builds on the concept of grades of iconicity, whereby 
icons form a scale with varying degree of complexity at the conceptual level. 
Metaphors involve a greater distance from their objects compared to diagrams and 
images.  
 
What we see clearly in the semiotic understanding of modelling is how the analytical 
dichotomy objects vs. models is useful, but also misleading. For analytical purposes 
the object is the apple and the models (icons) are the three different examples. But the 
object changes when the model changes; the meaning of the apple in the metaphorical 
example above is different from the apple in the diagrammatic example. The context 
                                                 
12 Note that the term ‘sensuously’ (rather than, e.g., ‘sensorial’) occurs here for specific reasons. 
While one of our current senses of ‘sensuous’ has hedonistic and even erotic connotations, this was not 
the case for philosophers in the 19th century. For continental philosophy in particular (e.g., Kant and 
Hegel) the term ‘sensuousness’ is used in connection to the immediacy of nature and in relation or 
opposition to conceptual understanding. Sensuous encounter is hence considered to be devoid of 
analytical consciousness and intention. Peirce uses the term to refer to the impression of experience in 
its (conscious) immediacy as well as individuality situated in space and time with no ontological or 
moral bearing. 
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of the interpretation changes the sign but the sign also changes the context of 
interpretation.  
Space and Time 
In his model of media modalities, Elleström distinguishes between four, namely, the 
material, sensorial, spatiotemporal, and semiotic modalities (Elleström 2010). This is 
not a claim for any linear development through the modalities; it is rather an 
analytical distinction to clarify various aspects of a media expression. Different 
configurations of the four modalities can be used to specify the characteristics of 
specific media.  
While the focus in this paper is on the semiotic modalities of models as media 
expressions, our analysis, as we will see later with the examples, also considers the 
other three modalities. For our purpose it is especially important to understand how 
the spatiotemporal modality structures the experience of the material interface through 
which we encounter a media expression into conceptions of space and time. When we 
read a text and when we study a map we act in time. But the time operates differently. 
In most types of text the space of the printed or written page is turned into one or 
several sequences of characters and words, read in a pre-defined order. In studying a 
map we can let our eyes wander in any pattern while still getting to the meaning of the 
map.13 
Examples in DH 
In this paper we take previous research (Ciula and Eide 2014; Ciula and Marras 2016) 
one step further by mapping Kralemann and Lattmann’s trichotomy of models as 
                                                 
13 On Elleström's system for media modalities applied to modelling of spatial information in DH, 
see Eide (2015b).  
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icons to examples of digital modelling in DH research dealing with historical 
artefacts. These prototypical cases were chosen to investigate how model types relate 
to the cultural objects they represent and how modellers reason with them. 
If we accept Kralemann and Lattmann’s argument it follows that by modelling we 
link models to qualities and relationships already existing in the objects being 
modelled. Such linking is based on choices which are made for a certain end 
informing and motivating the act of modelling. Models are contingent, created in 
actual scholarly situations of production and use. A model is partially arbitrary in that 
the same inferences drawn by manipulating one model could have been reached in 
other ways, for instance using a different model. 
In this framework, models operate as sign-functions initiating a sign-relation 
(model-relation). To understand their epistemic role, we need to look at both how they 
come to be and how the similarity relation with the object is realised. By analysing the 
association of syntactic attributes of the source object with the attributes of the model 
we focus on the latter; that is, the representational correspondence. To explain the 
semantics of the model, the analysis of the similarity relation needs to be 
complemented with an analysis of the overall sign-relation in which production and 
use of models is enacted, as indicated in Fig. 1. Three examples will be used to 
analyse the three types of sign-functions and relations in a DH context. 
In general one could say that every DH model is a diagram in that it is a 
formalism of logical and mostly mathematical nature; in this respect, Flanders and 
Jannidis talk about ‘data structure’ as different from ‘data modelling’ (Flanders and 
Jannidis, 2015, 8). However, we believe we can in fact identify different grades of 
iconicity corresponding to the three model types mentioned above, namely image, 
diagram, and metaphor. The classic example that comes to mind to represent an 
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image-like model is a 3d graphic model such as, for instance, the model of an 
historical monument. The digital model acts as a surrogate of or a substitute for the 
reconstruction of the real object. A diagrammatic version of the same model could be 
the mathematical equations used to create the graphical 3d model. Below we dwell on 
three examples in detail. 
Example 1: Image-like Model 
We will use an example from digital palaeography research (Ciula 2005; 2009), 
where the abstract model letter acts as an image-like model of the samples it was 
algorithmically generated from. What we can learn about the objects of analysis (the 
medieval handwritten letterforms) depends on the features being selected in the 
modelling process. What is relevant for the scope of this paper is that the inferential 
power of the model is mainly based on a strong immediate similarity (what above was 
called resemblance) between model and object. We can unpack this further by stating 
that the similarity is first and foremost of spatial nature: the handwritten letter is a 
two-dimensional spatial object as its spatial model is. However, their temporalities are 
different. We encounter single instances of letters in the manuscript pages, while the 
morphing models shown in Fig. 4 incorporate variants that can be visualised in 
sequence. 
This specific palaeographical model is based on immediate similarity relevant for 
this context. The ‘a’ of the model looks very much alike the ‘a’ of the handwriting in 
the manuscript, they have the same spatiality. Its hermeneutical power relies, 
however, also on a different temporality between object and model. Anchoring the 
reasoning on the spatial similarity and going beyond it enables us to learn new things 
about the object. Indeed, new inferences are fostered by the availability of an ‘actual’ 
temporal element in the morphing of the model. While we have to look at all single 
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instances in the manuscript, we get a model which incorporates all variants and by 
sliding from left to right, we can ‘see’ those variants in real time.  The object itself, 
however, is not temporal in this sense. So while the model is an abstraction – a fuzzy 
image which loses the precision of the instances out of which it was generated 
(representation is indeed asymmetrical) while keeping a basic (symmetrical) 
similarity to it – it gains an actual temporal mode that the single instances objects do 
not hold. If the modeller can make any inferences this is also due to her awareness of 
scribal variants and of what morphological traits are more revealing of different 
dating and location than others. So context and prior knowledge are important not 
only for the creation of models but also – not surprisingly – for their interpretation.14  
 
Fig. 4: Image-like model. Morphological features of segmented letter forms are 
modelled into an average morphing letter. Inferences on the manuscript handwriting 
                                                 
14 Note that interpretation involves multiple and intertwined processes of signification; iconic 
signs are indeed “mixed with indexical and symbolic ways of interpreting” (cf. Elleström 2013: 113). 
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are based on the analysis of the morphing letter-models in virtue of an ‘immediate 
resemblance’ between the original letters and the model.  
Example 2:  Relational Model 
As an example we will use models of landscapes described in historical sources, 
where textual information is modelled in the form of maps (Eide 2015b). The 
inferential power of the model relies on the analogous relational structure between 
object and model. When the text says “A is north of B” it makes a claim about a 
geometrical relationship between places denoted in the text. A map showing A north 
of B makes a claim expressing a similar geometrical structure. What new we can 
know about the object of analysis depends very much on the correspondence between 
the structuring of the textual expressions in the modelling process and the structure of 
the map model. 
The model–object relationship here is not between an expression and a landscape 
but between two expressions in different media, as shown in Fig. 5. These media 
express structural relationships in fundamentally different ways. In order to see the 
structural similarity one needs to understand the written language being used in the 
text, the schemata used in topographical maps to convey meaning, and have 
experience of real landscapes. These elements define the context of the model. 
In this example ‘similarity’ is not immediate resemblance. The digital model – the 
map – looks completely different from the source object – the text, but there is a 
structural similarity between the two. This structural similarity possesses a strong 
hermeneutical potential. It can be used to reveal gaps; there are things expressed in 
the text that cannot be put on the map. Examples of things that cannot be expressed 
include open, borderless expressions such as “the area north of the river” and 
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ambiguous expressions such as “Either A or B is on the border.”15 The analogy breaks 
at some point; the examples show how the signification of rich expressions in the text 
cannot be communicated via the structure of the map. Realising this can lead to new 
knowledge, or rather to renegotiating what a text can mean, the meanings of a text. 
Based on the structural correspondence and non-correspondence between the virtual 
geographical space of the text and the geographical space of the map, the map makes 
the virtual space ‘visible’ and in so doing reveals a dissimilarity. It pinpoints the 
degree to which the text is underspecified spatially, how open the virtual space of the 
text is. This forces our understanding of the text to change.16 
 
Fig. 5: Relational model. Relational textual expressions are modelled into geometrical 
relations. Inferences on space as expressed in the text are drawn in virtue of the 
corresponding spatial structure in the map.  
                                                 
15 Various attempts have been made to put such things on maps. See Eide (2015b) for an extensive 
discussion. 
16 This is exactly what happened in the modelling experiments described in Eide (2015b), where 
differences between the structures expressed in the text and structures expressible as maps were found. 
The model could not express what the source object expressed. 
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Example 3: Metaphor-like Model17 
Finally, we will use the example of network models used to capture information about 
references to persons in historical sources. These can be used to tie specific textual 
passages to real world historical entities, but also to form parts of networks of co-
references (Eide 2009). The association of things shaped as woven networks (e.g. leaf 
venation, a spider or a fishing net) or of technical networks (e.g. in 
telecommunication) to describe relationships between people is metaphorical.18 The 
inferential power of the model leverages on a deep conceptual similarity between the 
model (the topography of a network) and the object (e.g., kinship of historical 
characters). It can generate unexpected connections between the objects it represents, 
which exist ‘only’ metaphorically in a network. 
In the example in Fig. 6 we see a historical picture of a man and a woman laying 
her hand on his. The literature over the reading of this 15th century paining by Jan van 
Eyck19 is vast. For example, one interpretation of this image sees it as a claim that the 
two depicted persons are married; another suggests more subtly that the joining of 
arms is rather an act of presentation by the man in the picture of the child to be borne 
in the woman’s womb to the destinatary in the mirror, hence exhibiting the fatherhood 
of the painter (Lancioni 2012). Whatever the symbolic link between the figures, the 
physical link establishes a bond between them. This bond can be associated to and 
hence expressed as a link between two nodes in a network. 
 
                                                 
17 In Kraleman and Lattman (2013) these models are claimed to be based on semiotic similarity, 
but this appears categorically misleading to us so we privilege the concept of metaphor taken from 
Peirce. 
18 For a recent discussion on the benefits and pitfalls of the use of network as metaphor in social 
sciences see Erickson (2012). 
19 The National Gallery, London, image number NG186. 
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Fig. 6: Metaphor-like model. Person names and their relationships as referred to by a 
document are modelled respectively into entities (nodes) and into properties 
connecting them (links). Assertions of co-reference are also modelled into properties 
connecting entities. Thus the net is used to model social relations as well as assertions 
about people. 
There are also other types of links deduced from historical documents that can be 
expressed using a network model. One is co-reference, for instance in the case where 
two person references expressed by two different statements, such as names in texts or 
pictures of identifiable persons, refer to the same person. A source can for instance 
claim that B and C, the person on the image and a name in a text, refer to the same 
person. Such claims can also be expressed as links between nodes in a network.  
Both these types of links are metaphorical. There are no strings attaching 
occurrences of names referring to the same historical characters to each other, and 
there are no connections between historical persons that bear any structural similarity 
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to the topography of a net. The social network in the model is a projection of a 
conceptual framework. Concepts from our understanding of social relations are 
combined with a sequential object, the text, and a two dimensional painting, to form a 
spatial network model. 
But the development and use of such models change our view on history, we start 
seeing relationships as networks. The network gains hermeneutical power and makes 
visible as well as quantifiable aspects of a past family network or societal relations.  
However, different types of relationships (family vs. co-reference) easily lose their 
particularity and become ‘just’ links. The chain of signs become greedy and takes 
over another cognitive space or plane which in fact deals with relations with a 
different semantics, in our example moving from the plane of assertion of social 
relations to the plane of assertion of co-reference. 
One meaning can trigger others; e.g., the links between entities not only connote a 
relation (e.g. kinship), but their length or thickness might also be interpreted as more 
or less distance between those entities (i.e. more or less related); in this sense the sign 
(model) takes a life of its own. A link in the net is just a link, and a documented co-
reference relationship becomes like a supposed marriage. Gabor 
This feeds back to our view of the modelled objects; in other words: the 
context/prior knowledge influences the construction and interpretation of the model, 
but is also in turn influenced by it. 
 
Common for all three types of models is the inferential power operating at the 
interplay between their ‘intrinsic structure’ and their ‘extrinsic mapping’ (Kralemann 
and Lattmann 2013, 3409). Indeed, the features being selected in the modelling 
process are influenced by contextual elements of different kinds, including 
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hypothesis, scholarly methods and conventions, sample selection, and the 
technologies being used. However, the inferential and epistemic power of the model 
relies both on extrinsic and intrinsic aspects of the model relation. In the former case, 
examples show us how – sometimes with vivid immediacy – similarity of existing 
verifiable qualities between object and model enable DH modellers to manipulate 
models to make new sense of those objects. In the latter case, examples show us again 
how models are conductive to new meaning and further modelling through our 
exercising of a certain imaginative freedom in selecting salient qualities and 
associating concepts.  
Conclusions 
In the paper we focused on some aspects highlighted in Kralemann and Lattmann’s 
semiotic theory of models with respect to the role of context in modelling acts and the 
nature of the representational relation between objects and models through practical 
examples. We believe that these two foci are where modelling practices in DH meet 
with this semiotic framework in productive ways to explain both formal and open 
aspects of modelling practices. 
We contextualised this framework with specific examples of image-like, 
relational, and metaphor-like modelling in DH research. Prior knowledge is a sine qua 
non to create models in the first place and to use them as interpretative tools with 
respect to the objects they are signs of (Ciula and Eide 2014). The relationships 
between modelling processes and interpretative outcomes are neither mechanical nor 
directly causal (Ciula and Marras 2016); however, the type of similarity on which 
modelling relies shapes the interpretative affordances of those ‘anchor’ models. 
Modelling processes bring about investments and burdens with respect to our 
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knowledge of the objects we model. In particular, models as signs relate to the 
interpretation of those objects in different ways, from the immediate similarity on the 
image end of the iconic continuum to the imaginative ramifications of conceptual 
similarity on the metaphorical end. To understand the inferential, epistemic, and 
heuristic role of models as sign-relations, we need to look at both how they come to 
be (context; i.e., how we make our prior knowledge explicit and in most cases 
formalized) and how the similarity relation with the object is used to create meaning 
(new knowledge).  
In summary, studying the “single respects” (Kralemann and Lattman 2013: 3401; 
in Peircian terms “the ground of the representantem”) by which a model becomes a 
sign for an object is useful to explain both the logic and syntax of DH models within 
specific contexts. It demonstrates how these models are built as well as how the 
relation with the object is realised, e.g., in terms of spatio-temporal modalities. The 
selection of salient qualities or features to exhibit in the models plays a crucial role 
both in the creation and interpretation of these models. Such selection is however not 
necessarily human-driven only. We increasingly use computing algorithms to 
facilitate or even propose that selection, especially in complex environments where 
variables are many and interconnected (e.g., pattern recognition in image processing 
or textual similarity in stylometry). 
Our examples showed how the relationship of iconicity between the model and 
the object being modelled is partly extrinsically determined (it relies on the similarity 
between the model and the object) and partly guided by intrinsic choices (it depends 
on theory, conventions, imaginative associations, and prior knowledge). Indeed we 
showed how the inferential power operates at the interplay between their ‘intrinsic 
structure’ and their ‘extrinsic mapping’ (Kralemann and Lattmann 2013: 3409). A 
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future challenge would be to explore how the interplay between intrinsic structure of 
models (selection of salient qualities) and extrinsic mapping (their iconic ground) 
develops in the creation of scholarly arguments in the humanities. 
From this exploration of the semiotics of models we gained a different way to 
look at and analyse models: models as a type of signs mediating between the 
impressions of experience and freedom of association. In future research we aim to 
combine further studies of modelling practice in DH with interdisciplinary studies of 
modelling in the sciences and the long tradition of abstraction, representation, and 
modelling in the humanities to expand the model of models presented here. The main 
challenge remains to grasp the iterative and generative translation of informal models 
into formal ones and vice versa.  
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